DAVID CRAIG v. IRINA GLASER, 07 December 2004, Sheriff Principal Sir Stephen S.T. Young
SHERIFFDOM OF GRAMPIAN HIGHLAND AND ISLANDS AT ABERDEEN
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SHERIFF PRINCIPAL SIR STEPHEN S T YOUNG Bt QC
in the cause
Pursuer and Respondent
Defender and Appellant
Act: Mrs Rowena McIntosh, solicitor, McIntosh McTaggart, Aberdeen
Alt: Mr Gareth Masson, solicitor, Adam Cochran, Aberdeen
Aberdeen: December 2004
The sheriff principal, having resumed consideration of the cause, refuses the appeal and adheres to the interlocutor of the sheriff dated 27 August 2004 under deletion where they twice appear of the words and figures "by 8 October 2004" and under deletion also of the words "on joint motion, sists the cause for the reports to become available"; reserves meantime the question of the expenses of the appeal and appoints parties to be heard thereon at Aberdeen Sheriff Court on 9th December 2004 at 2.15 pm.
 The parties in this case are the parents of a child Cameron who was born in England on 30 August 2002. They are not married. In terms of crave 1 the pursuer and respondent seeks to have the defender and appellant interdicted from removing the child from his care and control or furth of this sheriffdom without his express written permission or by further order of the court. In terms of craves 2 and 3 he asks the court to find and declare that he is the father of the child and to find that he is entitled to parental rights and responsibilities in relation to him. And in terms of crave 4 he asks the court to make an order to the effect that the child should be required to reside with him.
 In article 2 of the condescendence it is averred that the habitual residence of the child is with the defender at an address in Dorset. This at once raises two questions, namely (1) what jurisdiction this court has to grant the interdict sought or to make a residence order in relation to the child (both of which would be Part I orders within the meaning of the Family Law Act 1986), and (2) how it comes about that the pursuer, whose address is in Aberdeen, is seeking to have the defender interdicted from removing the child from his care and control or furth of this sheriffdom.
 Neither of these questions is satisfactorily addressed in the pursuer's pleadings. In particular, although they are replete with allegations about how unfit the defender is to care for the child, the pursuer's averments do not explain the history of the parties' relationship since the birth of the child or how it comes about that, despite the averment about his habitual residence, he is apparently in the care of the pursuer at his home in Aberdeen. But it was explained during the hearing of the appeal, and I did not understand there to be any dispute, that after the birth of the child the parties had lived together as a family in England until March 2004. They had then separated and the child had remained in the care of the defender, the pursuer thereafter having contact with him on a regular basis. In particular, on 28 July 2004 (or so I have noted it, although I think the correct date may have been about 21 July 2004)) the pursuer had contact with the child overnight. But, instead of returning him to the defender the next day, he took him from Dorset to Aberdeen without the defender's consent. It was said that there had previously been a discussion between the parties in the course of which they had agreed in principle that the pursuer should have residential contact with the child. In light of the pursuer's removal of the child to Aberdeen, the defender indicated that she would collect the child in a week's time and treat that week as a period of residential contact. On 9 August 2004 she went to the pursuer's home in Aberdeen, removed the child and took him back to her own home in Dorset. But she brought him back to Scotland to attend a child welfare hearing at this court on 27 August 2004 and since then the child has been in the care of the pursuer at his home in Aberdeen.
 In the defences it is admitted that the child's habitual residence is with the defender at her home in Dorset. Even if this had not been admitted, it seems to me that the effect of section 41 of the Family Law Act 1986 would have been that the child would be treated as continuing to be habitually resident in England for a period of one year after he was removed by the pursuer from the care of the defender without her consent and taken to his home in Aberdeen.
 In answer 2 it is admitted that this court has jurisdiction and, when he came to address me, the defender's solicitor drew attention to section 6(e) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907. This provides that any action competent in the sheriff court may be brought within the jurisdiction of the sheriff where the action is for interdict against an alleged wrong being committed or threatened to be committed within the jurisdiction. But this provision is expressly stated to be subject to Chapter III of Part I of the 1986 Act which includes section 8 to 12 inclusive of the Act. In its application to the sheriff court, section 12 provides that, notwithstanding that any other court, whether within or outside Scotland, has jurisdiction to entertain an application for a Part I order, the sheriff shall have jurisdiction to entertain such an application if the child concerned is in the sheriffdom on the date of the application and the sheriff considers that, for the protection of the child, it is necessary to make such an order immediately. The defender's solicitor accepted that both the interdict sought in terms of crave 1 and the residence order sought in terms of crave 4 were Part I orders within the meaning of the 1986 Act and further, as I understood him, that there was sufficient material in the pursuer's averments, in particular in relation to the likelihood of the child's sustaining injury in the event of his return to the defender's home, to entitle this court to assert its emergency jurisdiction under section 12. (In this context reference was also made to section 14(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995).
 As already indicated, the pursuer's averments are replete with allegations about the defender's unfitness to care for the child. These are to be found in particular in articles 4, 5 and 6. (In passing, I observe that the author of these pleadings appears to have overlooked the wise advice in Macphail's Sheriff Court Practice (2nd Edn) at paragraph 9.46 to keep the articles of condescendence brief). Reference is made to a whole series of incidents in which the child was allegedly neglected by the defender in one way or another while in her care. It is said, for example, that on a number of occasions she left the child, while still a baby, unattended on a bed with the result that the child fell off and hurt himself. On another occasion it is said that she left the child unsupervised at the top of a flight of stairs and that the child fell all the way down these stairs. It is said that she left the child unsupervised beside her car by the road, that she allowed him to crawl and walk about upon kitchen work surfaces and sit next to open flames on a gas cooker, that he has frequently been covered in large bruises and on two occasions has sustained bad cuts, that she frequently transported him in a completely broken car seat, that she refused to purchase necessary medication for him, that she left him unattended in a high chair without fitting his safety harness onto him, that she permitted him to swallow stones and so on and so forth. The pursuer avers that he has constantly pointed out to the defender how seriously she puts the health and physical and mental well-being of the child at risk and that she has refused to receive any such advice from him. And he says that the child is at risk of serious physical injury due to her neglect of him and that in all the circumstances the interdict sought is necessary for the protection of the child.
 The action was raised on 27 July 2004 when Sheriff Harris granted a warrant to cite the defender and ad interim interdicted her from removing the child from the pursuer's care and control or furth of the sheriffdom without his express written permission or by further order of court. On 3 August 2004, on the motion of the pursuer and in the absence of the defender, the sheriff continued the interim interdict previously granted until further order of the court.
 On 10 August 2004 a motion was enrolled on behalf of the pursuer in terms of which he moved the court, inter alia, to ordain the defender to appear personally before the court to explain her failure to obtemper the interlocutors pronounced on 27 July and 3 August 2004 in respect that she had removed the child from the care and control of the pursuer and furth of the sheriffdom without his express written permission or by further order of court and to grant an interim residence order to the effect that the child should reside with the pursuer. On the same date, having heard the pursuer's agent on this motion, the sheriff dispensed with the requirement of intimation and induciae in respect of the motion and ordained the defender to appear personally before the court on 13 August 2004 to explain her failure to obtemper the earlier interlocutors. The sheriff continued consideration of that part of the motion which related to the granting of an interim residence order.
 On 13 August 2004 both parties were represented before Sheriff Cowan. Her interlocutor records that, on the motion of the defender, she continued the child welfare hearing until 27 August 2004, the defender having given an undertaking to appear at that hearing and to bring the child to Aberdeen. (The basis upon which the hearing before Sheriff Cowan fell to be treated as a child welfare hearing is not apparent from the papers in the case).
 On 27 August 2004 both parties appeared with their respective solicitors before Sheriff Cusine. The outcome of this hearing was that the sheriff pronounced an interlocutor in the following terms:
The Sheriff, Having heard parties' procurators on the Pursuer's motion made at the Bar to have the Defender found in contempt in respect of her failure to obtemper the Interlocutors dated 27 July and 4 August 2004 in respect that she removed the child, Cameron Ashley Bobby Craig, born 30 August 2002 from the care and control of the Pursuer, without the Pursuer's express written permission, or by further order of the Court; Continues consideration of the same; instructs the Sheriff Clerk to request the Process Server, Harold John Shore, 34 Nursery Road, Moordown, Bournemouth, Dorset, to identify those documents which were served by him on the Defender, she personally having admitted receiving service of the Initial Writ, and Forms F15 and F26 but not the Interlocutor dated 27 July; ad interim Makes a Residence Order whereby the said child shall reside with the Pursuer; Makes no Orders in relation to contact meantime; ex proprio motu Appoints Mr Richard Ward, Solicitor, Aberdeen to report to the Court by 8 October 2004 on all the circumstances and proposed arrangements for the care and upbringing of the said child Cameron Ashley Bobby Craig; Appoints the Director of Children and Families, Borough of Poole, to report to the Court by 8 October 2004 on the background, circumstances and proposed arrangements for the care and upbringing of the said child Cameron Ashley Bobby Craig; Ordains the Defender to instruct said reports and be responsible for payment of same in the first instance; on Joint Motion, Sists the cause for the reports to become available.
It is this interlocutor which is the subject of the present appeal.
 On 10 September 2004 a note of appeal was lodged on behalf of the defender. The material part of this reads as follows:
At a Child Welfare Hearing on 27 August 2004 the Sheriff made an Interim Residence Order in favour of the Pursuer. This involved the child Cameron Craig born 30 August 2002 being removed from the care of the Defender and placed in the care of the Pursuer. The Defender respectfully appeals against said judgement on the following grounds:-
- In reaching his decision the Sheriff failed to give any reason for his finding other than that the Defender had breached an Interim Interdict, a copy of the which (sic) the Defender claimed not to have received.
- That the Sheriff failed to exercise his discretion reasonably in so far as there was no independent evidence other than allegations by the Pursuer that the child was in any danger whilst in the care of the Defender. The sheriff failed to have regard to the independent evidence contained in the Defender's First Inventory of Productions which tended to suggest said child was in no danger whilst in the Defender's care.
 In response to the note of appeal the sheriff wrote a note dated 21 September 2004. He dealt firstly with the question whether or not the defender was aware of the terms of the interim interdict which had been granted against her. For present purposes I need say no more about this. The sheriff then explained why he had granted an interim residence order as follows:
At the hearing on 27 August, the Defender personally made various allegations about the Pursuer's unsuitability to have care and control of the child, but on 27 July, the sheriff was obviously satisfied that there were grounds for the interim interdict which he granted. Nothing which the Defender said on 27 August about the Pursuer persuaded me that he was not a suitable person to have care and control on an interim basis. Furthermore, I was of the opinion that I was entitled to assume that the Defender had been served with all of the documents as stated in the certificate mentioned above, and that she had taken a deliberate decision to ignore the order of this court and removed the child.
The Defender's productions were drawn to my attention and I considered them. Again, there was nothing in them which persuaded me that the Pursuer should not have care and control of the child on an interim basis. There is a letter among the productions (No. 6/1/3 of Process) about the child's enrolment at a fee-paying school in Dorset. The letter indicates that the fees have been paid, and it was accepted that the payment had been made by the Pursuer. He expressed some concern about the Defender's ability to maintain payment, as she is currently in receipt of State Benefit, which was not denied by the Defender.
There was some disagreement about whether the Defender was still a member of the Unification Church ("The Moonies") but I gave no weight to this matter.
The reasons which I articulated for my decision on 27 August to make an interim residence order in favour of the Pursuer were the averments in the Initial Writ about the Defender's behaviour and the fact that she had failed to obtemper the interlocutor of 27 July, by deliberately taking the child to Dorset without the Pursuer's consent.
 Opening the appeal, the defender's solicitor outlined briefly the history of the case and dealt with the question of jurisdiction. He then turned to the merits of the appeal which he acknowledged was directed against an exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the sheriff. He referred to Britton v Central Regional Council 1986 SLT 207 and accepted as a correct statement of the law the passage in the opinion of the court delivered by the Lord President where his Lordship stated: "In presenting his submission in support of the reclaiming motion counsel for the reclaimer recognised at the outset that this appellate court may not interfere with the decision of the Lord Ordinary unless it is satisfied either that he exercised his discretion upon a wrong principle or that, his decision being so plainly wrong, he must have exercised his discretion wrongly" (see also Early v Early 1990 SLT 221). The defender's solicitor submitted that the sheriff in the present case had erred on both counts, namely that he had exercised his discretion upon a wrong principle and that, his decision being so plainly wrong, he must have exercised his discretion wrongly. Reference was made to section 11(7) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 which in paragraph (a) provides that the court shall regard the welfare of the child concerned as its paramount consideration and shall not make any such order unless it considers that it would be better for the child that the order be made than that none should be made at all. It was submitted that the welfare principle and the principle of minimum intervention here stipulated were matters to which the sheriff should have had regard before granting an interim residence order in favour of the pursuer. It was pointed out that in his note the sheriff had made no reference whatsoever to either of these principles. It was further pointed out that the sheriff had not stated in his note that he had been persuaded by anything in the documents which had been produced by either side or otherwise that the defender herself was unsuitable to have care of the child. The sheriff had not made clear why he had thought it best for the child that he should reside with the pursuer and why it was better than not that an interim residence order should be made at that stage. It was not clear what principles the sheriff had had in mind in reaching his decision and his failure to address the correct principles in terms of section 11(7) necessarily undermined his exercise of his discretion.
 Referring to the final paragraph of the sheriff's note, the defender's solicitor drew attention to the emphasis which the sheriff had placed upon the averments in the initial writ. It was pointed out that these contained no more than what the pursuer offered to prove and did not amount to evidence. In this context the sheriff had said nothing about having been persuaded one way or another by the affidavits and productions which had been lodged by both parties (and to which, with the exception of the defender's productions, the sheriff had made no reference at all in his note). If the sheriff had not taken all the affidavits and productions into account, it could not be said that he had exercised his discretion appropriately. As for the defender's alleged failure to obtemper the interim interdict which had been pronounced on 27 July 2004, in a question between the parents of a child it did not follow that a parent who had been in breach of such an interim interdict was the wrong person to maintain care and control of the child. Under reference to Sinclair v Sinclair 1988 SLT 87 it was submitted that an apparent disregard by one parent of an order of the court should not necessarily result in the removal of the child in question from the care and control of that person. The fact that the defender had removed the child from the pursuer's care did not demonstrate her own unsuitability or inability to have care of the child and it was submitted that, in relying upon this factor, the sheriff had clearly not exercised his discretion properly. Moreover, in placing emphasis on the matters referred to in the final paragraph of his note, the sheriff, so it was said, had ignored other relevant matters, and in particular the fact that the child's primary residence since birth had been with the defender so that he had been in her care for most of his life with the exception of a brief spell in the summer just gone by. To have changed this status quo the sheriff would have had to have been satisfied that there were compelling reasons to do so. As it was, he had given no indication in his note that he had regard to this status quo or to the previous circumstances of the child's upbringing. Nor did he appear to have regard to the fact that the interim interdict dated 27 July 2004 had been made without opposition and on the basis of different criteria from those which fell to be applied in determining whether or not an interim residence order should be made.
 The defender's solicitor pointed out too that the sheriff in his note had made no reference to the age of the child notwithstanding that it was well established that the advantage to a young child of being in the care of his mother was a factor which fell to be taken into account. Reference here was made to Brixey v Lynas 1996 SC (HL) 1, and it was pointed out that, when the sheriff had dealt with the matter on 27 August 2004, the child had been three days short of his second birthday. In this situation, to have removed the child from the defender's care, the sheriff would have to have been satisfied upon the basis of reliable and independent material that the defender was no longer a suitable person to care for the child. No such material had been available to the sheriff.
 In conclusion it was submitted that the sheriff's decision to grant an interim residence order had been flawed with the result that the appeal should be sustained and the interim residence order recalled. In addition the interim interdict should be recalled so that the child could be returned to the care of the defender who, it was pointed out, alone had parental rights in relation to the child, the parties not being married.
 The pursuer's solicitor began by observing that, if the appeal had been directed only against the sheriff's decision to grant an interim residence order, then it would have been incompetent unless leave to appeal had been granted by the sheriff. But it was accepted that the appeal was competent without leave since, in terms of the final part of his interlocutor, the sheriff had sisted the cause - see section 27(c) of the 1907 Act.
 Turning to the merits of the sheriff's decision, the pursuer's solicitor submitted that, although he had not referred to the affidavits or the pursuer's productions which had been put before him, he must have taken these into account in reaching his decision. He had referred to the averments in the initial writ which contained serious allegations especially in view of the age of the child and which demonstrated the need for the child's protection. The affidavits likewise contained serious allegations. In particular the pursuer's affidavit narrated the history of the parties' relationship and the pursuer's concern for the welfare of the child over a considerable period of time. It was not true to say that the defender had been the main carer of the child. The pursuer worked from home and, when the parties had been together, he had tended to be responsible for the child's care while the defender had gone out for counselling sessions and to work for the Church of Scientology where she was employed three to four days and nights per week. After the birth of the child the parties had lived together until March 2004 and until then the pursuer had at best been the main carer and at worst an equal parent. Following the separation the defender had moved to a property nearer to the church to make it easier for her to work there and to attend her counselling sessions. The child had gone with her but between March and July 2004 the pursuer had continued to have the child stay with him on four nights a week, namely Wednesdays and Fridays to Sundays. The defender had never had a full day with the child as he had been left in the care of a childminder on the days when he had not been with the pursuer. So this was a very different situation from that of a mother who had been solely responsible for caring for her child.
 The pursuer's solicitor drew attention to the fact that the pursuer's affidavit referred to the defender's lack of responsibility and failure to protect the child. She suggested that it was not surprising that this affidavit should have been more detailed than others that might have been produced. The pursuer's parents in their affidavits spoke to events on the rare occasions when the defender had visited them. In addition to these affidavits, the sheriff would also have seen the defences which consisted almost entirely of denials and contained no positive information about the defender, her accommodation or the arrangements which she might make for caring for the child. As for the defender's productions, the medical certificates therein spoke of her difficulties but it was accepted that these were somewhat dated. In summary, the sheriff had had before him the initial writ which contained serious allegations about the defender's ability to care for the child and her own health. In addition there had been three affidavits for the pursuer, one for the defender (but not one from herself) and both parties' productions. All this evidence, so it was submitted, was such that the sheriff could not have failed to exercise his discretion in favour of the pursuer. Accordingly I should be slow to interfere with the sheriff's decision. It could not be said that his decision had been exercised upon a wrong principle or that it had been so plainly wrong that he must have exercised his discretion wrongly.
 The pursuer's solicitor then referred to the defender's failure to adhere to the interim interdict pronounced on 27 July 2004. She submitted that this was a serious matter and showed a lack of responsibility on the part of the defender and disregard by her of authority. She had been aware of the order of the court and yet had come to Aberdeen, gone to the pursuer's house and demanded that the child be returned to her. She had been asked to stay overnight to allow their lawyers to discuss matters. This request had been made both by the pursuer and by the police. At the time the defender had also assaulted the pursuer. On the basis that she alone had had parental responsibilities in relation to the child, the police had advised that they could not stop her removing him. So she had left that night and had taken the child back to her home in England.
 Referring to Brixey v Lynas, the pursuer's solicitor reiterated that this was not a case in which the child had been cared for in the main by the defender. The pursuer was still paying for her to receive counselling, and it was his wish that she should get better, both for her own sake and for that of the child. At present he had serious concerns about her ability to care for the child on a full-time basis. In the circumstances the appeal should be refused.
 In conclusion the pursuer's solicitor confirmed that the child was still residing with the pursuer, and that the defender had had two periods of residential contact with the child, each over a long weekend, since 27 August 2004.
 In a brief reply, the defender's solicitor stated that the allegations which had been made against her were denied. It was pointed out that the reports about her mental health dated back to 2001 and 2002 and her position was that she had overcome these difficulties which had not been a concern by the time of the child's birth. The sheriff's note was quite specific about the matters which he had taken into account and it could not be assumed what else had been in his mind. All this cast doubt upon his reasoning process.
 I have the impression that the sheriff in drafting his note may have overlooked the helpful passage in Macphail at paragraph 18.114 where it is stated:
In all cases where an appeal is or may be taken against a decision involving the exercise of a judicial discretion it is desirable that the sheriff should set out in his note the legal principles or statutory rules upon which he has proceeded; the facts, documents or evidence before him; the factors which he considered to be relevant to his decision; and the weight which he gave to each factor. An omission from the note of any matter canvassed before him may found an argument that he has wrongly ignored it or has misunderstood its importance to such an extent that the exercise of his discretion has led to a wrong result.
 In my opinion the fact of the sheriff's having apparently ignored this advice has had the result of leaving his decision to grant an interim residence order in favour of the pursuer wide open to an attack such as was made upon it by the defender's solicitor. Had it been appropriate to do so, I do not think that I should have had any difficulty in holding that the sheriff's reasoning process as expressed in his note was so flawed that I should have been entitled to interfere with his decision to the extent of recalling the interim residence order which he had pronounced.
 If I had been in the sheriff's position on 27 August 2004, I think that I might well not have granted an interim residence order in favour of the pursuer. Instead I think that I might have recalled the interim interdict. Pending the receipt of the reports which were being ordered, I doubt if I should have gone so far as to grant an interim residence order in favour of the defender. But since she alone had parental rights and responsibilities in relation to the child at that stage, the interim interdict having been recalled, she would have been free to take him back to her home in Dorset.
 The difficulty for the defender is that a period of over three months has now elapsed since the hearing on 27 August 2004, and throughout this period the child has been in the care of the pursuer at his home in Aberdeen. If I were to do now what I think I might well have done on 27 August 2004, the result could be that the child would be returned to the defender's care at her home only to be returned shortly afterwards to the pursuer's care if the decision of the court in light of the reports which have been ordered is that the child should continue to reside with the pursuer. I do not think that it would be consistent with the child's welfare to risk shuttling him back and forth in this way. The report from the Borough of Poole is already available, and I understand that the preparation by Mr Ward of his report is well advanced. So it ought not to be too long before the court is in a position to make a decision where the child should reside in light of the reports and pending a final determination of this issue. (Indeed, once the reports are available it may be possible at a child welfare hearing to determine this issue without further ado - see Morgan v Morgan 1998 SCLR 681). In these circumstances I think that it would in the interests of the child that he should remain in the pursuer's care for the time being, there having been no suggestion that he has not been properly cared for by him during the last three months or so. And of course, if no order is made that he should reside in the meantime with the pursuer, there is always the possibility that the defender might apply successfully to have the interim interdict recalled with the result that she could take the child back to England. It is for these reasons that I have decided to adhere to the interim residence order pronounced by the sheriff. But, as I have indicated, this may be reviewed by the court once both reports are available.
 I may perhaps comment on the fact that almost three months passed between the date of the sheriff's decision and the date of the appeal hearing. I had hoped that it would be possible to fix a much earlier date for the appeal to be heard. But it appears that the offer made on my behalf to do this was not received, in particular on the defender's side, with the enthusiasm that might have been expected in the circumstances. It must I should have thought have been plain that, the greater the length of time between the hearing on 27 August 2004 and the hearing of the appeal, the less likely it would be that the sheriff's decision might be reversed on appeal. In hindsight I should myself have perhaps insisted on fixing an early date for the appeal. But, rightly or wrongly and in order to maintain the cordial relationships that ought to exist between Bench and Bar in this as in any other court, I take the view that the court in fixing the date for the hearing of an appeal should, within reason, seek to accommodate the convenience of parties and their solicitors as well as its own convenience.
 I have had an opportunity now of reading the report from the Borough of Poole. It is interesting to note that it does not in the least bear out the pursuer's allegations about the defender's unfitness to care for the child. But of course it covers at best only half the story, so to speak. Likewise, I understand that Mr Ward's inquiries have so far been confined to the situation in Aberdeen, so that his report will likewise only present half the story. In my experience it is never very satisfactory that issues of residence and contact should be resolved by the court on the basis of two such incomplete reports (and in saying this I make no criticism of their respective authors). I think that it is much to be preferred in the interests of the child or children concerned that a single report should be produced which presents the complete picture. Accordingly I think that Mr Ward's inquiries should not be confined to Aberdeen but should extend to the defender's situation in Dorset and, if need be, also Yeovil (see paragraph 7.7 of the report from the Borough of Poole). I did consider the possibility of appointing Mr Ward of new to prepare his report with a specific instruction to visit the defender in England. But it seems to me that the terms of his existing appointment are already wide enough to cover this since these speak of his reporting to the court "on all the circumstances and proposed arrangements for the care and upbringing of the said child" (the emphasis is mine). In the circumstances I have decided that I should not disturb the existing appointment. But, lest there be any doubt about the matter, I should make it clear to all concerned that in my opinion Mr Ward's report ought to present to the court a complete picture of the child's situation, and that for this purpose he should visit the defender in either or both of Poole or Yeovil. To this end I have asked that a copy of this judgement should be sent direct to Mr Ward.
 It was agreed that the question of the expenses of the appeal should be reserved.